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Two digests died on `content_policy_blocked` (2026-11-20) — first content-filter failures on record incident active 2026-11-21 2026-11-21 2026-11-21 2026-11-22 high
cron
content-policy
provider-error
gmail
freshrss
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unclassified-failure
live-probe-cron-executions-db-2026-11-21
live-probe-cron-incidents-2026-11-21
live-probe-jobs-json-2026-11-21

Two digests died on content_policy_blocked (2026-11-20)

The first content-filter failures in the retained log. Two unrelated jobs, on two different feeds, died with the identical terminal string on 2026-11-20 — hours apart, with every other job in the window clean.

What happened

Job Job ID Slot (AWST) Execution Duration Terminal error
Gmail Action Digest 08eb86f02d37 08:31:06 → 08:32:45 a490b74a509e4303acad671ee1ee80cf 1m39s RuntimeError: content_policy_blocked: Output data may contain inappropriate content.
FreshRSS Midday News Briefing ecc1fc13655a 12:01:14 → 12:05:04 0e1c11f49313428799de604afe73595c 3m50s same string

Both jobs are pinned provider: custom:omni-101 / model: smart-route. Both carry failure_streak = 1 — i.e. isolated single failures, not chronic: the preceding slot of each job completed. FreshRSS Midday ran clean on 11-19 12:01.

What is established

  • The failure is raised by the model-facing API, not by the job logic. The string is a provider content filter surfaced to the job as a wrapped RuntimeError; the digest scripts assembled their input fine.

  • Both jobs alerted, and both alerts are unclosed. Incident rows:

    • 08eb86_c0cca1a55b96 — first seen 11-20 08:32:44, alerted_at 08:32:46
    • ecc1fc_5a10b70830d1 — first seen 11-20 12:05:03, alerted_at 12:05:05

    This is the opposite of incidents/2026-11-18-wiki-audit-credit-outage, which failed silently for two nights: here the alerting path worked end to end.

  • failure_type is recorded as unknown for both. The incident classifier does not recognise this class, so it can neither group nor auto-close it — a recurrence will alert, but will not be understood.

  • Both left a full transcript: ~/.hermes/cron/output/08eb86f02d37/2026-11-20_08-32-44.md and ~/.hermes/cron/output/ecc1fc13655a/2026-11-20_12-05-03.md.

What is NOT established

  • Whether the trigger was the request or the response. The message reads "Output data may contain inappropriate content", but a filter that scans a request payload reports the same way. The Gmail digest reads mail; the FreshRSS digest reads news — the shared factor is more likely a token the router's filter dislikes than the subject matter. The two output files above settle this: diff what the two prompts had in common.
  • Whether the router (omni-101) applies a filter its upstreams do not. If it does, the same feeds can fail again with nothing changed on this host. Probe: replay one of the two prompts against the router and against an upstream provider directly, and compare.
  • Whether it recurs. Two slots, two jobs, one day is a pattern worth watching — not yet a trend.

Standing risk

Two of the estate's daily digests sit behind a provider filter that has already rejected them once, and the classifier files the failure as unknown — so a recurrence will alert without being recognised. Cheapest mitigation if it recurs: no content-policy string is worth a lost digest — route the two digest jobs to a provider without the filter, or strip the highest-risk section from the prompt payload.

→ systems/scheduled-tasks, systems/mnemosyne