3.7 KiB
title, type, status, created, updated, verified_on, review_after, confidence, tags, sources
| title | type | status | created | updated | verified_on | review_after | confidence | tags | sources | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Two digests died on `content_policy_blocked` (2026-11-20) — first content-filter failures on record | incident | active | 2026-11-21 | 2026-11-21 | 2026-11-21 | 2026-11-22 | high |
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Two digests died on content_policy_blocked (2026-11-20)
The first content-filter failures in the retained log. Two unrelated jobs, on two different feeds, died with the identical terminal string on 2026-11-20 — hours apart, with every other job in the window clean.
What happened
| Job | Job ID | Slot (AWST) | Execution | Duration | Terminal error |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gmail Action Digest | 08eb86f02d37 |
08:31:06 → 08:32:45 | a490b74a509e4303acad671ee1ee80cf |
1m39s | RuntimeError: content_policy_blocked: Output data may contain inappropriate content. |
| FreshRSS Midday News Briefing | ecc1fc13655a |
12:01:14 → 12:05:04 | 0e1c11f49313428799de604afe73595c |
3m50s | same string |
Both jobs are pinned provider: custom:omni-101 / model: smart-route. Both carry
failure_streak = 1 — i.e. isolated single failures, not chronic: the preceding slot of each job
completed. FreshRSS Midday ran clean on 11-19 12:01.
What is established
-
The failure is raised by the model-facing API, not by the job logic. The string is a provider content filter surfaced to the job as a wrapped
RuntimeError; the digest scripts assembled their input fine. -
Both jobs alerted, and both alerts are unclosed. Incident rows:
08eb86_c0cca1a55b96— first seen 11-20 08:32:44,alerted_at08:32:46ecc1fc_5a10b70830d1— first seen 11-20 12:05:03,alerted_at12:05:05
This is the opposite of incidents/2026-11-18-wiki-audit-credit-outage, which failed silently for two nights: here the alerting path worked end to end.
-
failure_typeis recorded asunknownfor both. The incident classifier does not recognise this class, so it can neither group nor auto-close it — a recurrence will alert, but will not be understood. -
Both left a full transcript:
~/.hermes/cron/output/08eb86f02d37/2026-11-20_08-32-44.mdand~/.hermes/cron/output/ecc1fc13655a/2026-11-20_12-05-03.md.
What is NOT established
- Whether the trigger was the request or the response. The message reads "Output data may contain inappropriate content", but a filter that scans a request payload reports the same way. The Gmail digest reads mail; the FreshRSS digest reads news — the shared factor is more likely a token the router's filter dislikes than the subject matter. The two output files above settle this: diff what the two prompts had in common.
- Whether the router (
omni-101) applies a filter its upstreams do not. If it does, the same feeds can fail again with nothing changed on this host. Probe: replay one of the two prompts against the router and against an upstream provider directly, and compare. - Whether it recurs. Two slots, two jobs, one day is a pattern worth watching — not yet a trend.
Standing risk
Two of the estate's daily digests sit behind a provider filter that has already rejected them once, and the
classifier files the failure as unknown — so a recurrence will alert without being recognised. Cheapest
mitigation if it recurs: no content-policy string is worth a lost digest — route the two digest jobs to a
provider without the filter, or strip the highest-risk section from the prompt payload.