hermes-hq-push 0.9.47+ — Upgrade Refused by the Plugin Security Scan (dangerous verdict)
incident
open
2026-11-13
2026-11-13
2026-11-13
2026-12-13
high
plugins
security-scan
hq-push
plugin-guard
install
incident
live-hermes-plugins-list
live-plugin-manifest
live-config
live-plugin-guard-source
live-gh-pr
live-state-db
hermes-hq-push 0.9.47+ — Upgrade Refused by the Plugin Security Scan (2026-11-12)
The scan did its job and there is no way to overrule it. On 2026-11-12 (~17:38–18:29 AWST) the
attempt to take systems/hermes-hq-push past its installed 0.9.42 was refused before any file
was written, by the pre-install plugin security scan. The installed copy is untouched, still enabled,
and still delivering. The blocking finding is in the plugin's owndashboard-tile skill, and the
fix is sitting in an open pull request.
any critical ⇒ dangerous = hard block; medium/low alone ⇒ caution (installable, warned)
Installed after
unchanged — v0.9.42, tree mtime 2026-11-08 02:19, enabled, state user
Why no override was available (verified in source, not assumed)
The only config key is plugins.scan_on_install (default true; currently not set in
~/.hermes/config.yaml, so scanning is on). Setting it false disables the scan for every future
install — it does not overrule a verdict, it blinds the check. That is the wrong lever.
--force lifts caution only. Its own refusal text says so, and the code agrees. --allow-removed
is unrelated — it is the blocklist for catalogue removals.
No env var, no trusted-source list, no allowlist, no INSTALL_POLICY/trust_level for plugins.
Those mechanisms exist only in tools/skills_guard.py, reachable from the skills path
(skills.guard_agent_created). tools/plugin_guard.py:398 hardcodes trust_level="community" and
should_allow_plugin_install never reads it.
The block is a single unconditional branch at tools/plugin_guard.py:406-418: any verdict outside
safe/caution returns False, "Blocked (dangerous verdict, …)".
The fix, and why it is not merged
The critical is a pattern match, not a defect: the tile skill embedded its JSON payload in a shell
one-liner, which the scanner reads as obfuscation however benign the intent.
Field
Value
Repo / PR
mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins#2 — the repo's only open PR
Author
Tony0410 (Anthony)
Head
fork Tony0410/hermes-hq-plugins, branch fix/tile-skill-heredoc → base main
State
OPEN, mergedAt: null, mergeable: MERGEABLE, created 2026-11-12T10:00:01Z (updated 10:01:57Z)
Diff
+7 / −2 in one file — hermes-hq-push/skills/dashboard-tile/SKILL.md (the one-liner becomes a heredoc)
The gh CLI on this host is authenticated as Tony0410 with read-only access to
mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins, so the change had to travel fork → PR rather than as a branch push.
Impact
The upgrade path to 0.9.47+ is blocked until PR #2 merges upstream and the plugin is re-installed.
Nothing else in the estate is affected.
No app-side impact: the installed 0.9.42 keeps delivering to the Hermes HQ iPhone app; the refusal
happened before any file was replaced, so there is no half-installed state to clean up.
The block is fail-safe by design — the failure mode is "cannot upgrade", not "installed something
unchecked".
Related finding — the "stored hold-and-ask instruction" was never stored
The same evening, the alleged standing instruction to hold and ask before acting on plugin
security-scan warnings was searched for exhaustively: a recursive sweep of ~/.hermes
(184,716 files, generated/venv/browser-profile/SQLite trees excluded) for the phrases
wait for my answer, show me what it found, security scan flags and security-scan found zero
matches in any editable text file. The sentence exists only in state.dbconversation history
(58 rows). Nothing was removed and no policy was reverted, because no such policy was ever
persisted. Procedure recorded as the skill stored-instruction-search-and-removal.
Prevention / how this closes
Merge PR #2, then re-run the install. That is the whole fix.
If a standing exception is ever genuinely wanted, add an explicit trusted-source or allowlist path to
tools/plugin_guard.py — do not set plugins.scan_on_install: false. Turning the scan off is
not "allowing this plugin"; it is removing the check from every future install, including the ones
nobody is looking at.
Expect the same class of false positive again: any plugin shipping a shell one-liner that pipes JSON
into an interpreter will read as obfuscation. Author the pattern as a heredoc or a script file.