Files
agent-estate-wiki/incidents/2026-11-12-hq-push-upgrade-blocked-by-plugin-scan.md
Tony0410 e033a08f17 audit(2026-11-12): the estate's last incident closed itself; a past-0.9.42 hq-push install was refused by the plugin scan (fix parked in PR #2)
- 429 row cbfe43_ed01845310d8 closed resolved 2026-11-12T00:25:36 on the next clean slot; 0 of 137 unclosed
- 11-12: 176 rows / 175 completed / 0 failed / 1 running; 11-11: 172/172/0; deliveries 9/9 and 7/7 delivered
- NEW incidents/2026-11-12-hq-push-upgrade-blocked-by-plugin-scan.md (dangerous verdict, one critical in the
  plugin's own tile skill; --force cannot override; no per-verdict override exists)
- systems/hermes-hq-push.md corrected live (0.9.27 -> 0.9.42, tree mtime 2026-11-08 02:19, config line 13226)
- current-state / scheduled-tasks / index / log updated; skills-index regenerated; freshness 2026-11-13 (0 stale)
2026-11-13 00:41:15 +08:00

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---
title: hermes-hq-push 0.9.47+ — Upgrade Refused by the Plugin Security Scan (dangerous verdict)
type: incident
status: open
created: 2026-11-13
updated: 2026-11-13
verified_on: 2026-11-13
review_after: 2026-12-13
confidence: high
tags: [plugins, security-scan, hq-push, plugin-guard, install, incident]
sources: [live-hermes-plugins-list, live-plugin-manifest, live-config, live-plugin-guard-source, live-gh-pr, live-state-db]
---
# hermes-hq-push 0.9.47+ — Upgrade Refused by the Plugin Security Scan (2026-11-12)
**The scan did its job and there is no way to overrule it.** On 2026-11-12 (~17:38–18:29 AWST) the
attempt to take [[systems/hermes-hq-push]] past its installed **0.9.42** was refused before any file
was written, by the pre-install plugin security scan. The installed copy is untouched, still `enabled`,
and still delivering. The blocking finding is in the plugin's **own** `dashboard-tile` skill, and the
fix is sitting in an open pull request.
## What happened
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Attempted | `hermes plugins install mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins/hermes-hq-push --enable --force` |
| Refusal | `Blocked: Security scan blocked plugin install: Blocked (dangerous verdict, 1 critical of 39 findings (echo_pipe_exec)). --force does not override a dangerous verdict.` |
| Findings | **39 total — 1 critical**, the rest low/medium |
| Sole critical | `hermes-hq-push/skills/dashboard-tile/SKILL.md:41` — category *obfuscation*: the `echo '<json>' \| python3 …` one-liner |
| Verdict logic | **any** critical ⇒ `dangerous` = hard block; medium/low alone ⇒ `caution` (installable, warned) |
| Installed after | **unchanged** — `v0.9.42`, tree mtime **2026-11-08 02:19**, `enabled`, state `user` |
## Why no override was available (verified in source, not assumed)
- **The only config key is `plugins.scan_on_install`** (default `true`; currently **not set** in
`~/.hermes/config.yaml`, so scanning is on). Setting it `false` disables the scan for **every** future
install — it does not overrule a verdict, it blinds the check. That is the wrong lever.
- **`--force` lifts `caution` only.** Its own refusal text says so, and the code agrees. `--allow-removed`
is unrelated — it is the blocklist for catalogue removals.
- **No env var, no trusted-source list, no allowlist, no `INSTALL_POLICY`/`trust_level` for plugins.**
Those mechanisms exist only in `tools/skills_guard.py`, reachable from the *skills* path
(`skills.guard_agent_created`). `tools/plugin_guard.py:398` hardcodes `trust_level="community"` and
`should_allow_plugin_install` never reads it.
- **The block is a single unconditional branch** at `tools/plugin_guard.py:406-418`: any verdict outside
`safe`/`caution` returns `False, "Blocked (dangerous verdict, …)"`.
## The fix, and why it is not merged
The critical is a *pattern* match, not a defect: the tile skill embedded its JSON payload in a shell
one-liner, which the scanner reads as obfuscation however benign the intent.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Repo / PR | `mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins` **#2** — the repo's **only** open PR |
| Author | `Tony0410` (Anthony) |
| Head | fork `Tony0410/hermes-hq-plugins`, branch `fix/tile-skill-heredoc` → base `main` |
| State | **OPEN**, `mergedAt: null`, `mergeable: MERGEABLE`, created 2026-11-12T10:00:01Z (updated 10:01:57Z) |
| Diff | **+7 / −2 in one file** — `hermes-hq-push/skills/dashboard-tile/SKILL.md` (the one-liner becomes a heredoc) |
| Local clone | `/home/hermes/workspace/hq-plugins-fix` (commit `90c9d28`, branch checked out, clean) |
The `gh` CLI on this host is authenticated as **`Tony0410` with read-only access** to
`mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins`, so the change had to travel fork → PR rather than as a branch push.
## Impact
- **The upgrade path to 0.9.47+ is blocked** until PR #2 merges upstream and the plugin is re-installed.
Nothing else in the estate is affected.
- **No app-side impact:** the installed 0.9.42 keeps delivering to the Hermes HQ iPhone app; the refusal
happened before any file was replaced, so there is no half-installed state to clean up.
- The block is **fail-safe by design** — the failure mode is "cannot upgrade", not "installed something
unchecked".
## Related finding — the "stored hold-and-ask instruction" was never stored
The same evening, the alleged standing instruction to *hold and ask before acting on* plugin
security-scan warnings was searched for exhaustively: a recursive sweep of `~/.hermes`
(**184,716 files**, generated/venv/browser-profile/SQLite trees excluded) for the phrases
`wait for my answer`, `show me what it found`, `security scan flags` and `security-scan` found **zero
matches in any editable text file**. The sentence exists only in `state.db` **conversation history**
(58 rows). **Nothing was removed and no policy was reverted**, because no such policy was ever
persisted. Procedure recorded as the skill `stored-instruction-search-and-removal`.
## Prevention / how this closes
- **Merge PR #2**, then re-run the install. That is the whole fix.
- If a standing exception is ever genuinely wanted, **add an explicit trusted-source or allowlist path to
`tools/plugin_guard.py`** — do **not** set `plugins.scan_on_install: false`. Turning the scan off is
not "allowing this plugin"; it is removing the check from every future install, including the ones
nobody is looking at.
- Expect the same class of false positive again: any plugin shipping a shell one-liner that pipes JSON
into an interpreter will read as *obfuscation*. Author the pattern as a heredoc or a script file.
## Related
- [[systems/hermes-hq-push]]
- [[systems/hermes-agent]]
- [[systems/scheduled-tasks]]
- [[log]]