- 429 row cbfe43_ed01845310d8 closed resolved 2026-11-12T00:25:36 on the next clean slot; 0 of 137 unclosed - 11-12: 176 rows / 175 completed / 0 failed / 1 running; 11-11: 172/172/0; deliveries 9/9 and 7/7 delivered - NEW incidents/2026-11-12-hq-push-upgrade-blocked-by-plugin-scan.md (dangerous verdict, one critical in the plugin's own tile skill; --force cannot override; no per-verdict override exists) - systems/hermes-hq-push.md corrected live (0.9.27 -> 0.9.42, tree mtime 2026-11-08 02:19, config line 13226) - current-state / scheduled-tasks / index / log updated; skills-index regenerated; freshness 2026-11-13 (0 stale)
99 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
99 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: hermes-hq-push 0.9.47+ — Upgrade Refused by the Plugin Security Scan (dangerous verdict)
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type: incident
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status: open
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created: 2026-11-13
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updated: 2026-11-13
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verified_on: 2026-11-13
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review_after: 2026-12-13
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confidence: high
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tags: [plugins, security-scan, hq-push, plugin-guard, install, incident]
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sources: [live-hermes-plugins-list, live-plugin-manifest, live-config, live-plugin-guard-source, live-gh-pr, live-state-db]
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---
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# hermes-hq-push 0.9.47+ — Upgrade Refused by the Plugin Security Scan (2026-11-12)
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**The scan did its job and there is no way to overrule it.** On 2026-11-12 (~17:38–18:29 AWST) the
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attempt to take [[systems/hermes-hq-push]] past its installed **0.9.42** was refused before any file
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was written, by the pre-install plugin security scan. The installed copy is untouched, still `enabled`,
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and still delivering. The blocking finding is in the plugin's **own** `dashboard-tile` skill, and the
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fix is sitting in an open pull request.
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## What happened
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| Field | Value |
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|---|---|
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| Attempted | `hermes plugins install mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins/hermes-hq-push --enable --force` |
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| Refusal | `Blocked: Security scan blocked plugin install: Blocked (dangerous verdict, 1 critical of 39 findings (echo_pipe_exec)). --force does not override a dangerous verdict.` |
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| Findings | **39 total — 1 critical**, the rest low/medium |
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| Sole critical | `hermes-hq-push/skills/dashboard-tile/SKILL.md:41` — category *obfuscation*: the `echo '<json>' \| python3 …` one-liner |
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| Verdict logic | **any** critical ⇒ `dangerous` = hard block; medium/low alone ⇒ `caution` (installable, warned) |
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| Installed after | **unchanged** — `v0.9.42`, tree mtime **2026-11-08 02:19**, `enabled`, state `user` |
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## Why no override was available (verified in source, not assumed)
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- **The only config key is `plugins.scan_on_install`** (default `true`; currently **not set** in
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`~/.hermes/config.yaml`, so scanning is on). Setting it `false` disables the scan for **every** future
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install — it does not overrule a verdict, it blinds the check. That is the wrong lever.
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- **`--force` lifts `caution` only.** Its own refusal text says so, and the code agrees. `--allow-removed`
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is unrelated — it is the blocklist for catalogue removals.
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- **No env var, no trusted-source list, no allowlist, no `INSTALL_POLICY`/`trust_level` for plugins.**
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Those mechanisms exist only in `tools/skills_guard.py`, reachable from the *skills* path
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(`skills.guard_agent_created`). `tools/plugin_guard.py:398` hardcodes `trust_level="community"` and
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`should_allow_plugin_install` never reads it.
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- **The block is a single unconditional branch** at `tools/plugin_guard.py:406-418`: any verdict outside
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`safe`/`caution` returns `False, "Blocked (dangerous verdict, …)"`.
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## The fix, and why it is not merged
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The critical is a *pattern* match, not a defect: the tile skill embedded its JSON payload in a shell
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one-liner, which the scanner reads as obfuscation however benign the intent.
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| Field | Value |
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|---|---|
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| Repo / PR | `mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins` **#2** — the repo's **only** open PR |
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| Author | `Tony0410` (Anthony) |
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| Head | fork `Tony0410/hermes-hq-plugins`, branch `fix/tile-skill-heredoc` → base `main` |
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| State | **OPEN**, `mergedAt: null`, `mergeable: MERGEABLE`, created 2026-11-12T10:00:01Z (updated 10:01:57Z) |
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| Diff | **+7 / −2 in one file** — `hermes-hq-push/skills/dashboard-tile/SKILL.md` (the one-liner becomes a heredoc) |
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| Local clone | `/home/hermes/workspace/hq-plugins-fix` (commit `90c9d28`, branch checked out, clean) |
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The `gh` CLI on this host is authenticated as **`Tony0410` with read-only access** to
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`mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins`, so the change had to travel fork → PR rather than as a branch push.
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## Impact
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- **The upgrade path to 0.9.47+ is blocked** until PR #2 merges upstream and the plugin is re-installed.
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Nothing else in the estate is affected.
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- **No app-side impact:** the installed 0.9.42 keeps delivering to the Hermes HQ iPhone app; the refusal
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happened before any file was replaced, so there is no half-installed state to clean up.
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- The block is **fail-safe by design** — the failure mode is "cannot upgrade", not "installed something
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unchecked".
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## Related finding — the "stored hold-and-ask instruction" was never stored
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The same evening, the alleged standing instruction to *hold and ask before acting on* plugin
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security-scan warnings was searched for exhaustively: a recursive sweep of `~/.hermes`
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(**184,716 files**, generated/venv/browser-profile/SQLite trees excluded) for the phrases
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`wait for my answer`, `show me what it found`, `security scan flags` and `security-scan` found **zero
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matches in any editable text file**. The sentence exists only in `state.db` **conversation history**
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(58 rows). **Nothing was removed and no policy was reverted**, because no such policy was ever
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persisted. Procedure recorded as the skill `stored-instruction-search-and-removal`.
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## Prevention / how this closes
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- **Merge PR #2**, then re-run the install. That is the whole fix.
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- If a standing exception is ever genuinely wanted, **add an explicit trusted-source or allowlist path to
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`tools/plugin_guard.py`** — do **not** set `plugins.scan_on_install: false`. Turning the scan off is
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not "allowing this plugin"; it is removing the check from every future install, including the ones
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nobody is looking at.
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- Expect the same class of false positive again: any plugin shipping a shell one-liner that pipes JSON
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into an interpreter will read as *obfuscation*. Author the pattern as a heredoc or a script file.
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## Related
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- [[systems/hermes-hq-push]]
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- [[systems/hermes-agent]]
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- [[systems/scheduled-tasks]]
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- [[log]]
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