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title, type, status, created, updated, verified_on, confidence, tags, sources
title type status created updated verified_on confidence tags sources
Browser Backend system active 2026-07-22 2026-10-29 2026-10-29 high
browser
camofox
automation
live-probe
config
session-history

Browser Backend

Purpose

Browser automation for Hermes — web search, form filling, screenshot, CDP control, authenticated scraping.

Current Configuration (re-verified 2026-10-13)

  • Primary backend: Camofox (Firefox-based, anti-fingerprint) — systemd --user unit camofox-browser.service on the Hermes host itself (the unit path is /home/hermes/.config/systemd/user/…, and the VNC route is named after CT460). The older CT450 attribution below was not reproducible on 2026-10-13 — see the correction note.
  • Provider config: browser.cloud_provider: camofox, camera_provider: camofox
  • REST API: :9377 — live-verified 2026-10-13 (node server.js, CAMOFOX_PORT=9377; LISTEN *:9377). The :9093 figure in earlier revisions of this page is stale — nothing was listening on 9093 on 2026-10-13.
  • VNC viewer: NovNC websockify on 127.0.0.1:6080 → 127.0.0.1:5900, published as https://ct460.kangaroo-eel.ts.net/vnc-camofox
  • Steel Browser (CT201): Not reachable as of 2026-10-29 00:3x — host answers ping (2.5 ms) but CDP :9223 and REST :3000 refuse; plugin removed. See the 2026-10-29 correction below.

Camofox (local systemd --user service)

⚠ Earlier revisions titled this section "Camoufox (CT450)". Live-verified 2026-10-13: the service Hermes talks to is a systemd --user unit on the Hermes host (/home/hermes/.config/systemd/user/camofox-browser.service), reached at localhost:9377, with its VNC route published as …/vnc-camofox. Treat any "runs on CT450 / CT201" claim as unverified until re-probed.

  • Host: the Hermes host itself (CT460) — systemd --user unit resolved on hostname = hermes, no network hop
  • Deployment: Systemd service camofox-browser.service
  • Engine: Camoufox (custom Firefox build with anti-detection fingerprinting)
  • Display: Headed via Xvfb :99 (1600×1200×24) + fluxbox window manager
  • Auth: Persistent profile anthony — authenticated into Uber Eats, LinkedIn, etc.
  • Connection: REST API and WebSocket bridge both at localhost:9377 (see the port correction above)
  • Last verified: Jul 30 — browserConnected: true, sessions: 1, tabs: 1, active 200s on scroll/navigate

Access

Endpoint URL Used by
REST API http://localhost:9377 Hermes browser tools + direct REST (/tabs, /start, /sessions)
VNC (NovNC) https://ct460.kangaroo-eel.ts.net/vnc-camofox Visual session viewer (websockify 127.0.0.1:6080 → 127.0.0.1:5900)

⚠ Port correction (2026-10-13): earlier revisions listed the REST API on :9093 and a separate CDP WebSocket on :9377. Live probe: the only Camofox listener is node server.js on *:9377 (with CAMOFOX_URL=http://localhost:9377 in the unit). :9093 and :9378 were both closed. :9377 is the REST API and the WebSocket bridge — there is no separate 9093 service.

Config

  • cloud_provider: camofox in ~/.hermes/config.yaml
  • CAMOFOX_URL=http://localhost:9377 and CAMOFOX_API_KEY in ~/.hermes/.env
  • Unit environment (~/.config/systemd/user/camofox-browser.service): CAMOFOX_PORT=9377, CAMOFOX_PROFILE_DIR=/home/hermes/.camofox/profiles, ENABLE_VNC=1, HANDLER_TIMEOUT_MS=90000, NAVIGATE_TIMEOUT_MS=60000, SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS=600000, TAB_INACTIVITY_MS=300000, BROWSER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=300000, Restart=always, RestartSec=5. (The unit also carries an API key value — deliberately not reproduced here.)
  • Profile: anthony (502913bf) — NOT persist-anthony. A clean public profile jobradar is used for job-board scraping.

Resource containment (live-verified 2026-10-13)

The unit carries a drop-in ~/.config/systemd/user/camofox-browser.service.d/resource-containment.conf:

[Service]
MemoryHigh=2G
MemoryMax=3G
MemorySwapMax=1G
OOMPolicy=kill

Observed ceiling event — 2026-10-12 07:01–07:23 (Daily Marketing Job Radar). A long browser run drove the service to the top of that containment window:

  • Mid-run: Memory: 2.5G (high: 2G, max: 3G, swap max: 1G, available: 0B, peak: 2.5G, swap: 1023.9M, swap peak: 1G), 383 tasks, uptime 9 days. Swap fully consumed, no reclaimable headroom.
  • Symptom: the REST /tabs endpoint and page evals began hanging (they look like ordinary tool timeouts).
  • Recovery: restart camofox-browser.service, then work one tab at a time, closing each before opening the next. Post-restart the host sat at ~2.1 GB of 14 GB.

Diagnosis: the limits held and OOMPolicy=kill never had to fire — the workload exceeded the cgroup, not a leak. A green cron row therefore does not mean the browser layer was healthy; check systemctl --user status camofox-browser.service (peak/swap/tasks) whenever a browser-heavy job runs long.

Restart (systemctl --user restart camofox-browser.service) is measurable roughly 16 h later as a healthy baseline: Memory: 16.5M cgroup, peak: 1.4G, swap peak: 234.5M, 16 tasks, browserConnected: false until the next session starts.

Steel Browser (CT201) — Disabled

  • Status: Still running on CT201, Hermes not connected since 2026-07-30
  • Plugin: browser-steel at /home/hermes/.hermes/plugins/browser-steel/ — disabled
  • CDP: http://100.96.244.39:9223
  • REST API: http://100.96.244.39:3000
  • UI: https://runtipi.kangaroo-eel.ts.net/steel
  • See: comparisons/steel-vs-camoufox for the full experiment story

History

  • 2026-07-22: Camoufox primary, cua-driver bridge
  • 2026-07-29: Steel Browser deployed on CT201, became primary
  • 2026-07-30: Steel reverted — CDP issues + DeepSeek 0731 tool name validation problems. Camoufox restored as primary.
  • 2026-08-02: Camoufox confirmed working with authenticated sessions (Uber Eats report via Camofox REST API)
  • 2026-10-12 — containment ceiling hit under a browser-heavy cron run. Daily Marketing Job Radar drove camofox-browser.service to 2.5G with swap fully consumed (available: 0B, 383 tasks, 9-day uptime); /tabs and evals hung until the service was restarted at 07:23:50 and the job finished one tab at a time. Workload problem, not a leak — limits (MemoryHigh=2G/MemoryMax=3G/MemorySwapMax=1G) held.
  • 2026-10-13 — page corrected against a live probe. REST port :9093 → :9377; :9378 (claimed "Camoufox UI") does not exist; CT450 host attribution replaced with the local systemd --user unit on the Hermes host (CT460). Containment drop-in documented. Same day, the 07:01 Job Radar session was audited end-to-end and its memory-pressure evidence added above.

Correction (2026-10-29) — Steel is out of the stack, not just disabled

Verified against live state at 2026-10-29 00:3x AWST:

  • Hermes is back on Camofox. config.yaml (mtime 2026-10-29 00:15:13) reads browser.cloud_provider: camofox, browser.camera_provider: camofox, engine: auto, cdp_url: "".
  • The browser-steel plugin is gone — ~/.hermes/plugins/browser-steel/ no longer exists and plugins.enabled carries no steel entry, so the plugin_steel toolset cannot be selected. Backup taken immediately before the change: config.yaml.bak-pre-steel-plugin-removal-20261028T161324Z (written 2026-10-29 00:13:24). A second backup, config.yaml.bak-pre-cloudprovider-fix-20261028T220057Z, records the 2026-10-28 22:00 attempt.
  • The Steel endpoint is not serving. ping 100.96.244.39 (runtipi/CT201) answers 2.5 ms, but http://100.96.244.39:9223/json/version (CDP) and http://100.96.244.39:3000/v1/health (REST) both return 000 — as does the LAN address 192.168.178.77:9223. The tunnel route https://runtipi.kangaroo-eel.ts.net/steel returns 502, and steel.martinwa.org no longer resolves. Earlier pages describing Steel as "still running on CT201" are superseded by this probe.
  • ⚠ Stale environment variable still exported: STEEL_BASE_URL=http://100.96.244.39:3000 is present in 10 live Hermes processes — the gateway tree (3371780, 3372125, 3372912, 3844013, 3880214, 3880663), agent-browser 0.26.0 (3843841), two chromium crashpad handlers (3843878, 3843880) and agentmail-webhook.py (402). It now points at a dead endpoint and clears only when the gateway is restarted. The config is explicit (cloud_provider: camofox), so it does not currently misroute browser calls — but it is a trap for anything that reads the variable.