--- title: OmniRoute `omni-101` Resource-Pressure 503s — Recurring Cron Failure Bursts type: incident status: active created: 2026-10-18 updated: 2026-10-20 verified_on: 2026-10-20 review_after: 2026-10-27 confidence: high tags: [cron, router, provider, infrastructure] sources: [live-sqlite-cron-executions, live-sqlite-cron-incidents, live-jobs-json, live-probe] --- # OmniRoute `omni-101` Resource-Pressure 503s — Recurring Cron Failure Bursts (burst 1: 2026-10-16 → 10-17; burst 2: 2026-10-19) **Status: ACTIVE — this is a recurrence, not a closed incident.** The failure mode came back **twice in four days** (10-16 → 10-17 and 10-19) with an identical signature on an identical node, and the **exact same 9-model-call blast radius** each time. The node was healthy before, between and after both bursts. **Burst 1:** first 503 failure row **2026-10-16 08:00:37**, last **2026-10-17 03:00:28** AWST — **19 hours**. 10-16 = **165 completed / 8 failed**, 10-17 = **163 / 5** (all five pre-03:01). **Burst 2:** **2026-10-19**, two clusters — **06:01** (single job) and **07:01 → 12:01** (six slots across seven jobs). 10-19 = **159 completed / 13 failed** against the previous day's 168 / 1. The node answers `/api/health` → `200 {"status":"ok"}` and `/v1/models` → `401` (auth-required) — re-probed **2026-10-20 00:03 AWST**, mid-recovery, still healthy. **Impact:** burst 1 = **13 failed execution rows** (**9 genuine model-call failures across 7 jobs** + 4 derivative Mnemosyne Watchdog rows); burst 2 = **13 failed execution rows** (**9 genuine model-call failures across 8 jobs** + 4 derivative Mnemosyne Watchdog rows). Against the 10-14/10-15 storm tail (10-15 = 152 / 24) and the last clean day (10-12 = 175 / 0). Unlike the 10-14 storm, **the node was up and serving throughout both bursts** — model calls failed with `503` resource-pressure responses rather than TCP refusals. ## What happened Every model call on `custom:omni-101` (`http://100.78.63.20:20128/v1`) between the 10-16 08:00 and 10-17 03:00 slots died with the identical error: ``` RuntimeError: HTTP 503: Service temporarily unavailable due to resource pressure. Retry shortly. ``` | Job | Slot(s) AWST | Rows | Outcome | |---|---|---|---| | `1b23c042e17d` Enhanced Weekend Adventure Planner | 10-16 08:00 (Fri slot) | 1 | failed; streak **2**; next slot **Fri 10-23 08:00** | | `08eb86f02d37` Gmail Action Digest | 10-16 08:30 | 1 | failed; cleared 10-17 08:31 (own next run) | | `b63ed5817212` Mnemosyne Embedding Coverage Monitor | 10-16 12:00, 10-17 00:00 | 2 | failed; cleared **10-17 06:01** | | `ecc1fc13655a` FreshRSS Midday News Briefing | 10-16 12:00 | 1 | failed; cleared 10-17 12:02 | | `ea79a2107e36` Mnemosyne Health Monitor | 10-16 12:00, 10-17 00:00 | 2 | failed; cleared 10-17 12:02 | | `cbfe434a3b5e` Wiki Audit | 10-16 23:59 | 1 | failed; incident **open** (`detected`) — the 10-17 23:59 run is the one that produced this audit | | `1a8e90ea2271` Wiki Stocktake | 10-17 03:00 | 1 | failed; incident **open** (`detected`) | | `96eb95ce12f2` Mnemosyne Watchdog | 10-16 12:15 + 12:30, 10-17 00:15 + 00:30 | 4 | **derivative** — `Script exited with code 1`, its stdout quoting the watchdog's own log sentinel: `🚨 Log ERROR in agent.log/errors.log: Job 'Mnemosyne Embedding Coverage Monitor' failed: RuntimeError: HTTP 503…` | **8 rows on 10-16, 5 on 10-17.** Reading per job rather than per row: **7 jobs actually failed**, and four of the 13 rows are one sentinel watching another job's 503 — the same double-counting trap as the 10-14 storm (see [[incidents/2026-10-14-omniroute-node-connection-refused-storm]], lesson 4). Every 503 row sits on **`custom:omni-101`** — one alias, one node, again the single pin. No other job failed in this window: `85edf6772bca` (Tech & AI) and `dca8482e4f76` (Job Radar) both ran clean through it. ## Evidence - `~/.hermes/cron/executions.db` — the 9 model-call rows each carry the literal `RuntimeError: HTTP 503: Service temporarily unavailable due to resource pressure. Retry shortly.` The 4 watchdog rows carry `Script exited with code 1` plus the quoting stdout above. - `~/.hermes/cron/executions.db:cron_incidents` — **9 incidents opened in the window, 6 closed, 3 still open** (`1b23c0_103cbe04a79b` `alerted`; `cbfe43_9b89947a046a` and `1a8e90_3c9c1d573cde` `detected`). **The ledger tags 7 of the 9 `failure_type: unknown`** even though the message was explicit (the two watchdog rows are classed `script`, correctly — they *are* script exits); for the seven real 503s the classifier had the message in hand and still filed no type. Open incidents overall: **12 → 8** (5 `alerted` / 3 `detected`). - **The node itself was never down.** `/api/health` → `200 {"status":"ok"}` and `/v1/models` → `401` on `100.78.63.20:20128` at 2026-10-18 00:33 AWST. A 503 is a *serving* failure, so reachability probes (which the nightly audit and the operator both run) could not have caught this — only job-level error text did. - **No node-side telemetry was retained.** Nothing on the Hermes side records host CPU/RAM/queue depth at 10-16 08:00, so the burst can be described but not explained. Treat the root cause as **unknown**. ## Recurrence — burst 2 (2026-10-19) An **identical** failure returned 44 hours after burst 1 ended, on the same node, with the same error string and the same number of genuine model-call failures. Nothing on the Hermes side changed between the two bursts. | AWST (2026-10-19) | Job (name and schedule per `jobs.json`) | Slot | Result | Failure streak after | |---|---|---|---|---| | 06:01:05 | `b63ed5817212` Mnemosyne Embedding Coverage Monitor | `0 */6 * * *` | `RuntimeError: HTTP 503 … resource pressure` | 1 | | 07:01 | `dca8482e4f76` Daily Marketing Job Radar | `0 7 * * 1-5` | same | 1 | | 07:01 | `85edf6772bca` Tech & AI Newsletter Digest (Analytical) | `0 7 * * *` | same | 1 | | 08:01 | `0e519874d280` Political News Digest (Mon/Thu) | `0 8 * * 1,4` | same | 1 → **2** | | 08:31 | `08eb86f02d37` Gmail Action Digest | `30 8 * * *` | same | 1 | | 09:01 | `c0a9fa314542` GitHub Trending Radar — Weekly Roundup | `0 9 * * 1` | same | 1 | | 12:01:16 | `b63ed5817212` Mnemosyne Embedding Coverage Monitor | `0 */6 * * *` | same (2nd slot of the day) | **2** | | 12:01 | `ea79a2107e36` Mnemosyne Health Monitor | `0 */12 * * *` | same | 1 | | 12:01 | `ecc1fc13655a` FreshRSS Midday News Briefing | `0 12 * * *` | same | 1 → **2** | | 06:16, 06:31, 12:16, 12:31 | `96eb95ce12f2` Mnemosyne Watchdog | `*/15 * * * *` | `Script exited with code 1`, stdout quoting `b63ed5817212`'s 503 — **derivative** | 1 | **9 genuine model-call failures across 8 jobs** (burst 1 was 9 across 7), plus the usual 4 derivative watchdog rows = **13 failed execution rows**, the same total as burst 1. Whole day: **159 completed / 13 failed** (10-18 was 168 / 1; 10-17 was 163 / 5). - **Failed rows by hour:** 06:xx → 3 (one model call + two derivative watchdog reds), 07:xx → 2, 08:xx → 2, 09:xx → 1, 12:xx → 5. Nothing after 12:31 failed — the 15:00 → 23:00 slots and the 10-20 00:00 slots all completed. - **Not one failure landed in the `no_agent` / script jobs' own logic.** Every 503 was on an `agent`-mode job whose model call sits on `custom:omni-101`, exactly as in burst 1. - **The blast radius is now the stable signature**: the same nine job/slot combinations that carry the heaviest prompts fail first, while short-prompt jobs on the same node come through. A node under load-shedding is dropping the *large-context* calls preferentially. - **Single pin, now verified:** as of 2026-10-20 grep of `jobs.json` shows **every one of these eight jobs reading `provider: custom:omni-101`, `model: smart-route`** — no alias diversity at all. ⚠ The burst-1 note above records a wider alias mix (`deepseek-paid-smart`, `free-IA`, `dark`); `jobs.json` no longer matches that, so the pins may have been consolidated since 10-16. **Confirm with Anthony before relying on either reading.** - **Three incident rows auto-closed** — `96eb95_565ec1deb1c7` at **12:46:11** (the Watchdog's 12:30 slot recovered once its subject job recovered), `b63ed5_bbe44c89aac1` at **18:01:56** (the 18:01 coverage slot succeeded) and `ea79a2_747b27556fd0` at **2026-10-20 00:04:24** (the Health Monitor's 00:01 slot succeeded). **Four new incident rows opened** (`dca848_867d9caa96a8`, `85edf6_256c5e150bc4`, `0e5198_ec2fac98a91d`, `c0a9fa_764558b5ae83`) because those four jobs had never carried this error signature — the other five 503s folded into pre-existing rows, and `08eb86_472c7b609c80` + `ecc1fc_c9976ea24553` were **refreshed from 2026-10-16**, not reopened. **Unclosed ledger rows: 13** (12 `alerted` / 1 `detected`) as of 2026-10-20 00:09; 4 opened and 2 closed on 10-19. *(Caution: the 10-16/10-18/10-19 entries reported `12`, `8` and `7` open — those figures used a narrower filter than a raw `closed_at IS NULL` count, which reads 12 for 10-19 00:20 and 13 now. Compare like with like from here on.)* - **Every failure streak is still 1 or 2.** No job has consecutively failed enough to be suppressed, and the 10-20 00:00 slots all ran clean. Non-clean `last_status` across the fleet moved **7 → 12** (10 `error`, 2 `delivery_failed`) — see [[systems/scheduled-tasks]]. - **Re-probed 2026-10-20 00:03 AWST:** `omniroute-1` → `/api/health` `200 {"status":"ok"}`, `/v1/models` `401`. Healthy, as it was during both bursts. **A green health endpoint still proves nothing about the model path.** ### What this changes - The 10-18 assessment — *"it recovered on its own; nothing was changed on the node; monitoring"* — is **superseded**. A self-clearing fault that returns twice in four days with an identical blast radius is a **standing operational risk**, not a closed incident. Status moved `monitoring` → **`active`**. - Burst 1 left **no captured host telemetry**; burst 2 was likewise *not* instrumented while it was happening, for the second time. The "capture metrics during the burst" lesson from 10-18 was not acted on. **The next occurrence must be caught live** (see [[systems/scheduled-tasks]] for the probe to run). - **`github-trending-radar`'s 2026-10-19 09:01 slot — its scheduled Monday run (`0 9 * * 1`) — was lost to the 503**, so this week's roundup never went out. Its revoked Telegram delivery token (recorded in [[systems/scheduled-tasks]] Known Issues and [[current-state]]) **remains untested for a second week**, because the job has not reached its own code on a Monday since 2026-10-12. The next Monday slot (2026-10-26) is the first real test. ## Why this is not a repeat of the 10-14 storm | | 2026-10-14 → 10-15 | 2026-10-16 → 10-17 | |---|---|---| | Failure class | `ConnectError: [Errno 111] Connection refused` | HTTP `503` resource pressure | | Node state | TCP-unreachable for ~34 h | up and answering probes throughout | | Blast radius | 12 jobs, 24 model-call failures, every call for 34 h | 7 jobs, 9 model-call failures, bursty, self-cleared | | Recovery | manual node recovery | none needed — cleared on its own | Both are the **same single-node topology problem**: all enabled model-calling cron jobs ride `custom:omni-101` with no failover, three days apart from the previous outage. ## Consequences - **One stocktake hole:** `raw/stocktake/freshness-20261017.txt` was not written and `systems/skills-index.md` stays stamped **2026-10-16** (the 10-16 03:00 slot succeeded, so `freshness-20261016.txt` exists). The **2026-10-18 03:00 slot** closes it — nothing was regenerated by hand, because a manual run would race the scheduled one. A failure there would be the second consecutive miss. - **The Wiki Audit lost its 10-16 slot**, so no wiki pass covered the 10-14→10-17 span until this run. - **Stale flags clear only at the next success, and some slots are a week apart.** `1b23c042e17d` is a Friday job: it will sit at `last_status: error`, streak 2, with an open incident until **Fri 2026-10-23 08:00**. On a weekly cadence a one-slot failure reads as a week-long outage. ## Lessons 1. **Same topology, second failure mode in three days.** A 503 from a *live* node cannot be detected by reachability probes; only per-job error text distinguishes "node down" from "node overloaded". Both classes gate the whole scheduled estate. 2. **Watchdog rows inflate the count — read per job.** 4 of the 13 rows are one log sentinel reacting to another job's failure, not independent faults. 3. **The incident classifier drops the failure type.** All **seven** genuine 503 incidents are filed `failure_type: unknown` despite an explicit message in the execution row (only the two script-exit watchdog incidents get a type), so `failure_type` cannot be used to triage — filter on the error text. 4. **A 503 burst leaves no evidence behind.** No host telemetry is captured at failure time, so the "resource pressure" cause is taken on the router's word. If this recurs, capture the node's host metrics *during* the burst, not afterwards. 5. **A self-clearing burst is not a resolved incident.** Burst 1 closed as "monitoring" on 10-18 and the identical fault returned within 44 hours. **Recurrence with an identical signature and an identical blast radius is the signal that a fault is systemic** — the second occurrence, not the first, is the one that should change a page's `status`. Two occurrences, same shape, four days apart, on a topology with no failover: treat the next one as expected. ## Open item (needs Anthony's call, unchanged from 10-14) The durable fix is the same one flagged in [[incidents/2026-10-14-omniroute-node-connection-refused-storm]]: a second provider pin on a subset of jobs, or router-side failover between `omniroute-1` and CT600 `omniroute`. **Not applied** — that is a routing decision, not an audit one. The 10-19 recurrence raises the cost of leaving it open: **two of the last four days took double-digit failures from this one node**, and every model-calling cron job still has exactly one route. ## Related - [[incidents/2026-10-14-omniroute-node-connection-refused-storm]] — the TCP-refusal storm, two days earlier, same node. - [[incidents/2026-10-09-cron-provider-timeout-storm]] — the first multi-day storm from this topology. - [[systems/omniroute]] — node layout, providers and pins. - [[systems/scheduled-tasks]] — per-window fleet tally and incident ledger.