--- title: OmniRoute `omni-101` Resource-Pressure 503s — Cron Failure Burst type: incident status: monitoring created: 2026-10-18 updated: 2026-10-18 verified_on: 2026-10-18 review_after: 2026-10-25 confidence: high tags: [cron, router, provider, infrastructure] sources: [live-sqlite-cron-executions, live-sqlite-cron-incidents, live-jobs-json, live-probe] --- # OmniRoute `omni-101` Resource-Pressure 503s — Cron Failure Burst (2026-10-16 → 2026-10-17) **Window:** first 503 failure row **2026-10-16 08:00:37**, last **2026-10-17 03:00:28** AWST — **19 hours**. **Status:** **Monitoring.** Every slot from the 2026-10-17 08:30 run onward completed green (10-16 = **165 completed / 8 failed**, 10-17 = **162 / 5**, and the 10-17 failures all pre-date 03:01). The node answers `/api/health` → `200 {"status":"ok"}` and `/v1/models` → `401` (auth-required) — re-probed 2026-10-18 00:33 AWST. **Impact:** **13 failed execution rows** — **9 genuine model-call failures across 7 jobs**, plus **4 derivative Mnemosyne Watchdog rows**. Against the 10-14/10-15 storm tail (10-15 = 152 / 24) and the last clean day (10-12 = 175 / 0). Unlike the 10-14 storm, **the node was up and serving throughout** — model calls failed with `503` resource-pressure responses rather than TCP refusals. ## What happened Every model call on `custom:omni-101` (`http://100.78.63.20:20128/v1`) between the 10-16 08:00 and 10-17 03:00 slots died with the identical error: ``` RuntimeError: HTTP 503: Service temporarily unavailable due to resource pressure. Retry shortly. ``` | Job | Slot(s) AWST | Rows | Outcome | |---|---|---|---| | `1b23c042e17d` Enhanced Weekend Adventure Planner | 10-16 08:00 (Fri slot) | 1 | failed; streak **2**; next slot **Fri 10-23 08:00** | | `08eb86f02d37` Gmail Action Digest | 10-16 08:30 | 1 | failed; cleared 10-17 08:31 (own next run) | | `b63ed5817212` Mnemosyne Embedding Coverage Monitor | 10-16 12:00, 10-17 00:00 | 2 | failed; cleared **10-17 06:01** | | `ecc1fc13655a` FreshRSS Midday News Briefing | 10-16 12:00 | 1 | failed; cleared 10-17 12:02 | | `ea79a2107e36` Mnemosyne Health Monitor | 10-16 12:00, 10-17 00:00 | 2 | failed; cleared 10-17 12:02 | | `cbfe434a3b5e` Wiki Audit | 10-16 23:59 | 1 | failed; incident **open** (`detected`) — the 10-17 23:59 run is the one that produced this audit | | `1a8e90ea2271` Wiki Stocktake | 10-17 03:00 | 1 | failed; incident **open** (`detected`) | | `96eb95ce12f2` Mnemosyne Watchdog | 10-16 12:15 + 12:30, 10-17 00:15 + 00:30 | 4 | **derivative** — `Script exited with code 1`, its stdout quoting the watchdog's own log sentinel: `🚨 Log ERROR in agent.log/errors.log: Job 'Mnemosyne Embedding Coverage Monitor' failed: RuntimeError: HTTP 503…` | **8 rows on 10-16, 5 on 10-17.** Reading per job rather than per row: **7 jobs actually failed**, and four of the 13 rows are one sentinel watching another job's 503 — the same double-counting trap as the 10-14 storm (see [[incidents/2026-10-14-omniroute-node-connection-refused-storm]], lesson 4). Every 503 row sits on **`custom:omni-101`** — one alias, one node, again the single pin. No other job failed in this window: `85edf6772bca` (Tech & AI) and `dca8482e4f76` (Job Radar) both ran clean through it. ## Evidence - `~/.hermes/cron/executions.db` — the 9 model-call rows each carry the literal `RuntimeError: HTTP 503: Service temporarily unavailable due to resource pressure. Retry shortly.` The 4 watchdog rows carry `Script exited with code 1` plus the quoting stdout above. - `~/.hermes/cron/executions.db:cron_incidents` — **9 incidents opened in the window, 6 closed, 3 still open** (`1b23c0_103cbe04a79b` `alerted`; `cbfe43_9b89947a046a` and `1a8e90_3c9c1d573cde` `detected`). **The ledger tags 7 of the 9 `failure_type: unknown`** even though the message was explicit (the two watchdog rows are classed `script`, correctly — they *are* script exits); for the seven real 503s the classifier had the message in hand and still filed no type. Open incidents overall: **12 → 8** (5 `alerted` / 3 `detected`). - **The node itself was never down.** `/api/health` → `200 {"status":"ok"}` and `/v1/models` → `401` on `100.78.63.20:20128` at 2026-10-18 00:33 AWST. A 503 is a *serving* failure, so reachability probes (which the nightly audit and the operator both run) could not have caught this — only job-level error text did. - **No node-side telemetry was retained.** Nothing on the Hermes side records host CPU/RAM/queue depth at 10-16 08:00, so the burst can be described but not explained. Treat the root cause as **unknown**. ## Why this is not a repeat of the 10-14 storm | | 2026-10-14 → 10-15 | 2026-10-16 → 10-17 | |---|---|---| | Failure class | `ConnectError: [Errno 111] Connection refused` | HTTP `503` resource pressure | | Node state | TCP-unreachable for ~34 h | up and answering probes throughout | | Blast radius | 12 jobs, 24 model-call failures, every call for 34 h | 7 jobs, 9 model-call failures, bursty, self-cleared | | Recovery | manual node recovery | none needed — cleared on its own | Both are the **same single-node topology problem**: all enabled model-calling cron jobs ride `custom:omni-101` with no failover, three days apart from the previous outage. ## Consequences - **One stocktake hole:** `raw/stocktake/freshness-20261017.txt` was not written and `systems/skills-index.md` stays stamped **2026-10-16** (the 10-16 03:00 slot succeeded, so `freshness-20261016.txt` exists). The **2026-10-18 03:00 slot** closes it — nothing was regenerated by hand, because a manual run would race the scheduled one. A failure there would be the second consecutive miss. - **The Wiki Audit lost its 10-16 slot**, so no wiki pass covered the 10-14→10-17 span until this run. - **Stale flags clear only at the next success, and some slots are a week apart.** `1b23c042e17d` is a Friday job: it will sit at `last_status: error`, streak 2, with an open incident until **Fri 2026-10-23 08:00**. On a weekly cadence a one-slot failure reads as a week-long outage. ## Lessons 1. **Same topology, second failure mode in three days.** A 503 from a *live* node cannot be detected by reachability probes; only per-job error text distinguishes "node down" from "node overloaded". Both classes gate the whole scheduled estate. 2. **Watchdog rows inflate the count — read per job.** 4 of the 13 rows are one log sentinel reacting to another job's failure, not independent faults. 3. **The incident classifier drops the failure type.** All **seven** genuine 503 incidents are filed `failure_type: unknown` despite an explicit message in the execution row (only the two script-exit watchdog incidents get a type), so `failure_type` cannot be used to triage — filter on the error text. 4. **A 503 burst leaves no evidence behind.** No host telemetry is captured at failure time, so the "resource pressure" cause is taken on the router's word. If this recurs, capture the node's host metrics *during* the burst, not afterwards. ## Open item (needs Anthony's call, unchanged from 10-14) The durable fix is the same one flagged in [[incidents/2026-10-14-omniroute-node-connection-refused-storm]]: a second provider pin on a subset of jobs, or router-side failover between `omniroute-1` and CT600 `omniroute`. **Not applied** — that is a routing decision, not an audit one. ## Related - [[incidents/2026-10-14-omniroute-node-connection-refused-storm]] — the TCP-refusal storm, two days earlier, same node. - [[incidents/2026-10-09-cron-provider-timeout-storm]] — the first multi-day storm from this topology. - [[systems/omniroute]] — node layout, providers and pins. - [[systems/scheduled-tasks]] — per-window fleet tally and incident ledger.