audit(2026-11-13): third zero-failed day and a fully clean fleet; the Uber Eats fix clears the last non-clean cron row — and the pre_tool_call hook timeout recurred at load 12.08 (incident reopened resolved -> active, state.db 2.04 GB)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ title: Anthony's Systems Wiki
|
||||
type: collection
|
||||
status: active
|
||||
created: 2026-07-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-11-12
|
||||
verified_on: 2026-11-12
|
||||
updated: 2026-11-14
|
||||
verified_on: 2026-11-14
|
||||
confidence: high
|
||||
tags: [index, infrastructure, systems, stream-failure, ct299, skills-index, generator-divergence, secrets-at-rest, incident, fire-claim-discard, job-radar, hook-timeout]
|
||||
sources: [live-cron-ledger, live-deliveries-db, live-incident-ledger, live-session-store, raw/stocktake]
|
||||
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ sources: [live-cron-ledger, live-deliveries-db, live-incident-ledger, live-sessi
|
||||
|
||||
# Anthony's Systems Wiki
|
||||
> Operational knowledge for Anthony's agents, infrastructure,
|
||||
> model routing and automation. Last updated: 2026-11-13.
|
||||
> model routing and automation. Last updated: 2026-11-14.
|
||||
> **2026-11-13 (nightly audit; live probes 2026-11-13 23:59 - 2026-11-14 00:2x AWST) — the fleet went fully clean, then the hook came back.** **2026-11-13: 174 ledger rows — 173 `completed` / 0 `failed` / 1 `running`** (this audit, started 23:59:41) — the **third consecutive zero-`failed` day** (11-11 172/172, 11-12 176/176); deliveries **8 / 8 `delivered`**, 0 `for_failure`; `cron_incidents` **0 unclosed**. **Every job now reads `last_status: ok` with `failure_streak` 0 — the fleet has no non-clean row at all**, because **`066bb5191280` (Uber Eats Monthly Spend Report) was fixed end-to-end on 2026-11-13**, clearing a `delivery_failed` that had stood since 2026-11-01. Two stacked causes: the job's **runtime prompt had grown to 88 k chars** (it carried two heavy browser skills) so the 2026-11-01 run exhausted its turn budget mid-format and shipped a truncated digest, and the `delivery_failed` label was a **stale `TELEGRAM_HOME_CHANNEL_THREAD_ID=34795` env var** that only clears on a gateway restart (**2026-11-13 13:14**). Fix: deterministic printer **`~/.hermes/cron/scripts/uber-eats-digest.py`**, rewritten prompt with a hard output contract, skills cleared (**88 k -> 1.8 k**); verified on the 18:51 -> 18:58 slot (**154 unique / 153 completed** orders, Oct **9 orders / $301.04**), lesson saved to `cron-job-maintenance`. Fleet **29 (26 / 3)** — an **eighth** window unchanged. ⚠ **But the window's fault is the `pre_tool_call` hook, and it returned:** `_pre_tool_call timed out after 120s` at **2026-11-14 00:05:40** plus **10** suppression lines through **00:06:38**, refusing this audit's own tool calls for ~1 minute (first-hand). `errors.log` by day: 11-12 **0/0**, 11-13 **0/0**, 11-14 **1/10** — the first such timeout in the retained log since the 2026-11-08 cascade (**`errors.log` now starts 2026-11-09 13:18:39**, so the 11-08 lines have rotated out and the page's 58-count stands on the 2026-11-09 read). **Load is the trigger and it has ~doubled: `load average 12.08 / 13.02 / 12.33` on 2 vCPU** (vs **5.89** at diagnosis), with **`state.db` now 2.04 GB** (**2,977 sessions / 207,577 messages**, was 1.89 GB / 2,901 / 197,682) and the root filesystem **88 % used**. The 30 -> 120 s fix is **proven insufficient**; [[incidents/2026-11-08-pre-tool-call-hook-timeout-cascade]] is **reopened, `resolved` -> `active`**, and `state.db` checkpoint/retention — not a bigger timeout — is now the estate's most urgent open item. Freshness (03:00 stocktake): **0 stale / 131 fresh / 3 no-date of 134**.
|
||||
>
|
||||
> **2026-11-11 → 2026-11-12 (nightly audit; live probes 2026-11-12 23:59 – 2026-11-13 00:4x AWST) — a clean day, and an upgrade that could not be installed.** The 429 row that was the estate's only open incident **closed `resolved` at 2026-11-12T00:25:36** (the next slot of the same job ran clean, carrying both windows); *cron_incidents* now reads **0 unclosed of 137**. **2026-11-12: 176 ledger rows — 175 `completed` / 0 `failed` / 1 `running`** (this audit, started 23:59:54), deliveries **9 / 9 `delivered`**; **11-11: 172 / 172 `completed` / 0 `failed`**, deliveries 7 / 7. Fleet **29 (26 / 3)**, a seventh window unchanged. The window's one new open item is not a failure: the attempt to take **`hermes-hq-push`** past its installed **0.9.42** was **refused by the pre-install plugin security scan** — *"Blocked (dangerous verdict, 1 critical of 39 findings (echo_pipe_exec)). --force does not override a dangerous verdict."* The critical is the plugin's **own** `skills/dashboard-tile/SKILL.md` one-liner; **no per-verdict override exists** (`plugins.scan_on_install: false` would blind the scan for *every* future install, and `plugin_guard.py` hardcodes `trust_level="community"`). The fix is **PR #2** on `mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins` (author `Tony0410`, `fix/tile-skill-heredoc`, **OPEN / MERGEABLE**, `mergedAt: null`, +7/−2 in one file), pushed from a fork because `gh` is **read-only** upstream. Installed 0.9.42 keeps delivering. Also: the alleged *"stored hold-and-ask instruction"* for scan warnings **does not exist on disk** (184,716-file sweep, zero matches in editable text; the sentence lives only in `state.db` history) — nothing was removed or reverted, and the hunt is now the skill `stored-instruction-search-and-removal` (**skills 299 → 300**). `config.yaml` is **byte-identical to its 2026-11-12 18:14:52 backup**; the only drift since 11-09 is the **model catalogue block** (6 out, 9 in). **New page:** [[incidents/2026-11-12-hq-push-upgrade-blocked-by-plugin-scan]].
|
||||
>
|
||||
>
|
||||
@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ sources: [live-cron-ledger, live-deliveries-db, live-incident-ledger, live-sessi
|
||||
## Incidents
|
||||
- [[incidents/2026-11-12-hq-push-upgrade-blocked-by-plugin-scan]] - **OPEN — the `hermes-hq-push` upgrade past v0.9.42 was refused by the pre-install plugin security scan.** `hermes plugins install mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins/hermes-hq-push --enable --force` returned **"Blocked (dangerous verdict, 1 critical of 39 findings (echo_pipe_exec)). --force does not override a dangerous verdict."** The sole critical is the plugin's **own** `skills/dashboard-tile/SKILL.md:41` shell one-liner (`echo '<json>' | python3 …` = *obfuscation*); the other 38 findings are low/medium and alone would have installed as `caution`. **`--force` lifts `caution` only**; a `dangerous` verdict is an unconditional block (`tools/plugin_guard.py:406-418`), and **no per-verdict override exists** — the only key is `plugins.scan_on_install` (default `true`, currently unset), which disables scanning for *every* future install; the `trust_level`/allowlist machinery lives in `tools/skills_guard.py` (the skills path) and `plugin_guard.py` hardcodes `trust_level="community"`. **Installed state unchanged:** v0.9.42, `enabled`, still delivering. **Fix = PR #2** on `mrcharlesiv/hermes-hq-plugins` (author `Tony0410`, `fix/tile-skill-heredoc` → `main`, **OPEN / MERGEABLE**, `mergedAt: null`, +7/−2 in one file, created 2026-11-12T10:00:01Z) — pushed from a fork because this host's `gh` account has **read-only** access upstream; local clone `/home/hermes/workspace/hq-plugins-fix` (`90c9d28`).
|
||||
- [[incidents/2026-11-10-wiki-audit-429-all-targets-skipped]] - **RESOLVED 2026-11-12T00:25:36** (self-cleared on the next slot's clean completion; *cron_incidents* now 0 unclosed of 137) **— the auditor failed, so 2026-11-10 was never audited.** `cbfe434a3b5e` (Wiki Audit — Nightly) ran **2026-11-10T23:59:54.486572 -> 2026-11-11T00:12:29.646987 = 12 m 35 s** and died on `RuntimeError: HTTP 429: Service temporarily unavailable: all targets were skipped by pre-dispatch filters (credits 100% conn:3021bab6) reset after 6h 24m 31s` (delivery `suppressed`) — **6 targets evaluated, `attempted 0`**, tenant `tn-5ud77abtl1` quota exceeded. Incident row `cbfe43_ed01845310d8` (`rate_limit`) was raised at 00:12:28 and is **still open with `alerted_at: NULL` — the estate's only open incident row**. Fleet non-clean `last_status` **1 -> 2**; pool reset ≈ **06:36:57**. Third symptom of the same router behaviour (cf. [[incidents/2026-10-21-omniroute-pre-dispatch-filter-skip]]).
|
||||
- [[incidents/2026-11-08-pre-tool-call-hook-timeout-cascade]] - **RESOLVED (same day) — the hook was the fault, not the schedule.** The `conduit_push` plugin is the **only** `pre_tool_call` registrant on the host (`__init__.py:119`) and its callback overran Hermes's **30 s** hook budget **58 times** between **2026-11-07 14:14:03** and **2026-11-08 08:21:03** (`errors.log`: **12** lines on 11-07, **46** on 11-08) plus **89** *"skipped after previous timeout or while still running"* suppression lines — every tool call degraded to slow-then-suppressed. **Fixed 2026-11-08 13:35 AWST: `plugins.hook_callback_timeout` 30 -> 120** in `~/.hermes/config.yaml`; the last timeout line remains 08:21:03 (re-verified at audit time). ⚠ **The plugin's caching was measured, not assumed, and was innocent** — `session_titles.py:21 CACHE_SECONDS = 30.0`, timed in-process at **3.1 s cold / 0.00 s warm**, so the *"re-opens a 1.87 GB `state.db` per call, ~9 s each"* theory was **wrong**; the trigger is **load** on the 2-core CT460 (`load average 5.89`, `state.db` checkpointing a **40 MB WAL**). **Cost:** *Mnemosyne Health Monitor* **8 h 27 m** and **5 h 59 m 51 s**; *FreshRSS Midday* **2 h 09 m 53 s**; stocktake failed a third day. **Next lever is `state.db` checkpoint/retention, not more caching.** → [[systems/conduit]], [[systems/hermes-agent]]
|
||||
- [[incidents/2026-11-08-pre-tool-call-hook-timeout-cascade]] - ⚠ **REOPENED 2026-11-14 — the hook was the fault, and the 30 → 120 s fix did not hold at current load.** The `conduit_push` plugin is the **only** `pre_tool_call` registrant on the host (`__init__.py:119`) and its callback overran Hermes's **30 s** hook budget **58 times** between **2026-11-07 14:14:03** and **2026-11-08 08:21:03** (`errors.log`: **12** lines on 11-07, **46** on 11-08) plus **89** *"skipped after previous timeout or while still running"* suppression lines — every tool call degraded to slow-then-suppressed. **Fixed 2026-11-08 13:35 AWST: `plugins.hook_callback_timeout` 30 -> 120** in `~/.hermes/config.yaml`; the last timeout line remains 08:21:03 (re-verified at audit time). ⚠ **The plugin's caching was measured, not assumed, and was innocent** — `session_titles.py:21 CACHE_SECONDS = 30.0`, timed in-process at **3.1 s cold / 0.00 s warm**, so the *"re-opens a 1.87 GB `state.db` per call, ~9 s each"* theory was **wrong**; the trigger is **load** on the 2-core CT460 (`load average 5.89`, `state.db` checkpointing a **40 MB WAL**). **Cost:** *Mnemosyne Health Monitor* **8 h 27 m** and **5 h 59 m 51 s**; *FreshRSS Midday* **2 h 09 m 53 s**; stocktake failed a third day. **Next lever is `state.db` checkpoint/retention, not more caching.** ⚠ **Recurred 2026-11-14 00:05:40** — **1 timeout + 10 skips**, overrunning the **120 s** budget at `load average 12.08` on 2 vCPU (**~2×** the 5.89 at diagnosis), with `state.db` grown to **2.04 GB**. Status **`resolved` → `active`**; the lever is now urgent. → [[systems/conduit]], [[systems/hermes-agent]]
|
||||
- [[incidents/2026-11-09-stocktake-completes-with-zero-edits]] (resolved 2026-11-11) - **RESOLVED BY ITSELF.** The nightly stocktake closed `completed` after **9 h 10 m** having landed **zero edits and no commit** — `failure_streak` 3 → 0 while the work stayed undone, and the top-priority item on its brief had been the monotonically worsening failure streak. Third consecutive day its findings never landed.
|
||||
- [[incidents/2026-11-09-job-radar-stage1-stall-silent-noop]] - **NO INCIDENT RAISED.** Job Radar Stage 1 overran to **9 h 09 m**, skipped its own verification, wrote **no handoff file**, and both Stage-2 slots ran before it finished and declined silently. No incident row was created — the completion-time-only alerting gap leaves the failure invisible.
|
||||
- [[incidents/2026-11-07-cron-claim-loss-in-gateway-restart-drain]] - **OPEN.** A restart requested at **~04:29:52** sat in *after-turn* mode for the full **1800 s**, then timed out and drained at **05:00:43/47** — the same `#77184` behaviour as the 10-31 reload, but this time it killed **two** in-flight cron executions: *Mnemosyne Health Monitor* (`ea79a2107e36`, 00:00:42.918 -> 05:02:22.870) and *wiki-stocktake-maintenance* (`1a8e90ea2271`, 03:00:31.515 -> 05:02:22.174), both closed **`failed`** on `lost its durable fire claim ownership`; systemd restarted the unit at **05:01:00** (`restart counter is at 3`). A **third** failure that night was the agent-log ERROR watchdog correctly catching the event 19 s later. The request landed **inside the `conduit_push` self-update window** (04:27:55 -> 04:32:32, its own ledger recording `restarting_gateway` = *failed*) — the **working hypothesis for the requester, not proven**; the 0.22.5 -> 0.23.0 updater is excluded (receipt starts 05:05:13). ⚠ **Closed 0 -> 2 incident rows and neither alerted**: both `1a8e90_*` rows sit `detected` with `alerted_at: null`. The stocktake slot has now failed **two days running** (`failure_streak: 2`). Job Radar ran clean. → [[systems/scheduled-tasks]], [[systems/hermes-agent]], [[systems/conduit]], [[systems/mnemosyne]]
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user